Brave Librarian Speaks Out as ALA Facilitates CHILD Porn

Judith Krug defending child pornography in public libraries.

Former Illinois ACLU board member Judith Krug became American Library Association's greatest leader.  In the late Sixties, she personally set up the rules librarians nationwide follow to this day to the detriment of many communities.  One brave/anonymous librarian speaks out about her legacy of destruction, literally; his/her email is published for the first time anywhere below.

One of those rules from Judith Krug was that librarians are not to take action against child pornography viewers in public libraries:

"A librarian is not a legal process," Krug said. "There is not librarian in the country -- unless she or he is a lawyer -- who is in the position to determine what he or she is looking at is indeed child pornography."   

Source: "Libraries vs. Police in a Suit Sparked by Porn; Kent Case Centers on People's Rights and Protections," by Jeffrey M. Barker, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Reporter, 12 August 2002.

That statement of hers is an example of policy guidance she gave to public libraries nationwide:

Libraries and librarians are not in a position to make those decisions for library users or for citizens generally.  Only courts have constitutional authority to determine, in accordance with due process, what materials are obscenity, child pornography, or “harmful to minors.”
....
As for obscenity and child pornography, prosecutors and police have adequate tools to enforce criminal laws.  Libraries are not a component of law enforcement efforts naturally directed toward the source, i.e., the publishers, of such material. 

Source: "Guidelines and Considerations for Developing a Public Library Internet Use Policy," by Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, as archived 7 March 2016.

ALA "guidelines" for libraries to ignore child pornography.

Her policy to ignore child pornography in public libraries was followed by libraries:

Accordingly, even if the library employs a computer technician who could demonstrate that the patron was viewing child pornography on the computer, this is not a reportable criminal offense, the library’s computer technician is not under any statutory reporting obligation, and the Library’s Records Confidentiality Act may be violated if such a report is made. 

Source: "A Patron is Viewing What Appears to be Child Pornography On a Library Computer; What Should Be Done?," by Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, LTD, Library Law, 27 April 2011.

Library removing ghost of Judith Krug as ALA
hides policy advising librarians to ignore child porn viewing.

Library directors even forced their own librarians to cover up child porn viewing:

• "Whistleblower Confirms Library Cover-Up of Child Pornography and Confirms USA PATRIOT Act Used as Excuse," by Dan Kleinman, SafeLibraries, 4 July 2009.

Even library schools teach this dangerous ALA policy, e.g.:

• "LIS 670 Assignment: Proposal for Internet Use Policy," by Professor Donna Bair-Mundy, University of Hawaii, undated.
• "Comparison of Public Library Internet Access Policies: St. Louis Public Library system and Cleveland Heights-University Heights Public Library," by Professor Amy Pearson, School of Information Sciences at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, undated.

Buy Shut Up! or
borrow from library.

Finally change has taken place—after decades—and after

1. over a decade of my own work,
2. the listing of the American Library Association on the annual Dirty Dozen List by the National Center on Sexual Exploitation, and
3. the publication of a book by public library child pornography whistleblowers Megan Fox and Kevin DuJan, the latter being my SafeLibraries co-author. 

Finally, the American Library Association removed from its "guidelines" the directive to ignore child pornography.  See:

• "American Library Association Changes Child Porn Policies Due to SHUT UP! Busting Them!," by Kevin DuJan, HillBuzz, 27 May 2016.
• "Guidelines and Considerations for Developing a Public Library Internet Use Policy," by Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, as archived 8 April 2016.

Four years straight ALA has been on NCOSE's Dirty Dozen List
as a "Top Contributor to Sexual Exploitation."

Not only did ALA remove the directive to ignore child pornography, but it removed the entirety of the "guidelines"!  It basically censored itself!  The "guidelines" are still titled as such, but they now exist as a wholesale copy from another ALA policy that was not so prominently promoted previously.

And to cover up this debacle, ALA claimed the wholesale copying of a preexisting policy was merely an "excerpt," which is another in a long line of flat out lies to cover up its shameful and illegal activities, some of which can be seen in the brave/anonymous librarian letter published at the bottom.  Compare:

• "Guidelines and Considerations for Developing a Public Library Internet Use Policy," by Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, 26 March 2013 (but since deleted and replaced with preexisting policy circa April 2016), accessed 17 December 2016.
• "Libraries and the Internet Toolkit," by Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, 29 May 2007, accessed 17 December 2016.

To the librarians who mock public library child pornography whistleblowers, we whistleblowers forced ALA to completely remove its publicly visible dangerous policy that facilitated child pornography in public libraries nationwide.

That said, the ALA policy still suffers from serious flaws.  For example, it still decries "censorship" although the US Supreme Court ruled blocking Internet porn in public libraries does not violate the First Amendment.

And in a hilarious instance of ridiculous diktat, it states that the safety of children using Internet computers in colleges and universities can only be assured by their own parents.  No college student ever brings his mommy into the college library to protect him from Internet porn.  Yet here's ALA providing guidance making that a requirement:

Academic libraries usually do not have the same censorship problems as public and school libraries. Most users of academic libraries are students (over 18 years old) and faculty. As a result, users in academic libraries can freely access Internet resources. It is important that parents are aware that their children can be exposed to information that may not be age-appropriate when their children use academic libraries. Parents need to be mindful that, as in any other public space, children need to have parental supervision.  

Source: "Libraries and the Internet Toolkit," by Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, 29 May 2007, accessed 17 December 2016.

But ALA has really topped itself in the area of child pornography facilitation in public libraries.  Remember I said ALA changed its policy as a result of child porn whistleblowers? Recall I said it not only changed the policy but removed it completely, replacing it will an older, preexisting policy?  It did, but it wasn't because of the obvious reason.

The obvious reason for ALA to delete its policy facilitating child pornography in public libraries after years of pressure is that it has seen the light and no longer supports its previous policy position created by Judith Krug of the ACLU/ALA almost half a century ago.

But that is not the reason ALA removed its child porn facilitation policy.

ALA removed its child pornography facilitation policy to take it out of the public's view.  It removed the policy so child porn whistleblowers could no longer point a finger at evidence of the policy.  ALA has essentially gone dark on its child porn facilitation policies.  It fully intends to continue to facilitate child porn in public libraries.

There are a number of ways to know ALA is continuing to facilitate child porn in libraries:

1. It removed from public view its long standing policy to facilitate child pornography in public libraries, but only after long and determined effort by child porn whistleblowers, including the publication of a 600+ page book entitled, "Shut Up! The Bizarre War that One Public Library Waged Against the First Amendment."
2. It did this silently.  It did not announce any new policy to report child pornography.  It simply deleted the policy, substituted another one and claimed it was an excerpt.  There was no announcement of any change.  Neither Library Journal nor ALA's own American Libraries ran any stories on the new policy.
3. When one librarian (Karen Jensen) wrote in School Library Journal about how child porn should be reported in public libraries, she was basically ignored.  No one other than myself paid her any attention or retweeted her or commented on her writing.  She did not win any awards, like the "Intellectual Freedom Award" one library won for protecting child pornography.  It's just forgotten.  She's forgotten.  See: "Plan to Report Child Pornography in Public Libraries."
4. ALA is keeping in place all other policies and practices that help facilitate child porn in libraries, as I've listed above.  If it were truly interested in stamping out child pornography facilitation in public libraries, it would not only change its policy but also make other changes to effectuate the new policy.  It simply has not done or said anything.  Silence.
5. ALA whips up opposition to me and any child porn whistleblowers.  We are repeatedly attacked, even by the leader of ALA's "Office for Intellectual Freedom" who blocks me on Twitter, for example.  So much for intellectual freedom.  Libraries where I expose child porn facilitation also block me on Twitter.  ALA librarians are told to block me, and over a hundred do.  Now if you have a sincere change of heart about facilitating child porn in public libraries, you do not attack and silence the child porn whistleblowers, yet here is Jamie LaRue, leader of ALA's supposed intellectual freedom office, doing just that:

ALA in Orlando: blood drives, school supplies, many contributions. We stand by the victims, we offer aid. @Safelibraries does ... nothing.

— James LaRue (@jaslar) June 28, 2016

And here's a graphic in case he hides/deletes that evidence as well:

6. ALA actively trains librarians to thwart child pornography whistleblowers.  Evidence of this training was obtained by FOIA requests, some of which can be viewed here: Hatefest, and some of which can be seen in the brave/anonymous librarian letter published for the first time below.  The name "Hatefest" comes from my cowriter Kevin DuJan who, for reporting child pornography in a library, was repeatedly attacked for being gay, including at the training provided byALA where his being gay was used to attack Megan Fox who is another child porn whistleblower.  More FOIA information could have been obtained but ALA ordered librarians to violate their state records retention laws and state open government laws to instead destroy evidence of the training.  See: "Deny, Delete, Defend; American Library Association Orders Public Librarians To Destroy Public Documents To Preclude Public Disclosure of its 'Exposure'."  But it's too little, too late, and you can see in the FOIA responses ALA ordering librarians to do absolutely anything to "defend" child pornography viewers in public libraries, like destroying records, not recording records in the first place, misleading the media, or suing child porn whistleblowers for up to $500,000 for defamation.  And lo and behold, I was sued, along with Kevin DuJan and Megan Fox, for defamation.  See: "Bittman v Fox: SafeLibraries Dismissed Second Time."  So as you read through these FOIA responses, remember librarians were being trained that the child porn whistleblowers were self-interested evil out of town authors and prudes who must be stopped at all costs: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0ByZ7htC3sJifdWpYSWk0OFAwOG8?usp=sharing

And there is yet more evidence of how ALA facilitates child porn in public libraries.

Below is never before published information.  It is a letter received in response to the FOIA requests mentioned above.

Read about the homophobia ("Blondie kept pointing out that he is gay"), the hate ("you should not be hanging out all day with a gay guy"), the directions to destroy evidence from ALA.  Read how ALA controls what local libraries do to mislead local government, media, and citizens.  Read how he/she was ordered to destroy evidence, and he/she did as he/she was ordered.

Read the fear in this librarian's voice that he/she should dare speak out against the high and mighty ALA, facilitator of child porn.

For more on "Blondie," see: "2014-07-08 = OPPL Spokesperson Commits Disorderly Conduct/Breach of Peace According to Ofc. Schmidt."  I was sued for linking to this so please watch what ALA tried to have censored; "Blondie" is in green:

These are the tactics of people perpetuating a system of child pornography facilitation in public libraries nationwide.  This is what ALA does, by any means possible including homophobia and ordering librarians to defy the law by destroying documents.

And here it is in the words of one very frightened yet brave librarian, published below for the first time anywhere.  "I've never been to a workshop like this where afterwards it was a big thing to collect all the notes and pretend like it never happened."

To the librarians attending ALA's MidWinter meeting, wake up.  You may be joining the "Women's March" in Atlanta today seeking social justice, but you have your own injustice in your own backyard.  Homophobia.  Child pornography facilitation.  Sexual harassment of librarians caused by Internet porn viewers.  And so on.  All caused by ALA's own policies and actions.  It's time to clean it up.  And you can read it in the words of your own brave/anonymous peer, right now, just below. 

It's sad that a brave/anonymous librarian has to speak out about how ALA facilitates child pornography in public libraries nationwide.  It's worse that she can only speak to the child porn whistleblowers themselves because she fears ALA  Will anyone else speak up?.

---

Note: [Text in square brackets] means slight changes made to protect anonymity and to prevent retaliatory job action.  Paragraph spacing added.  SafeLibraries welcomes and protects anonymous input and is indeed the only source concerned about the Sexual Harassment of Librarians that's caused by unfiltered Internet pornography due to ALA policy and despite the law.

Key: Acorn = the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) that was exposed as a massive voter fraud by James O'Keefe and Hannah Giles of Project Veritas; ALA = American Library Association; FOIA = Freedom of Information Act; ILA = Illinois Library Association; Office for Intellectual Freedom = ALA’s so-called Office for Intellectual Freedom; Orland Park = Orland Park, IL;

People: Blondie = Bridget Bittman, Public Information employee of the Orland Park Public Library; Bob from the ILA = Robert P. Doyle, Executive Director of the Illinois Library Association; Director = Mary Weimar, Library Director of the Orland Park Public Library; Hillary Clinton = Hillary Clinton; Kevin = Kevin DuJan, whistleblower of child pornography at the Orland Park Public Library; Michelle Obama = Michelle Obama; Ms. Fox = Megan Fox, whistleblower of child pornography at the Orland Park Public Library; Sarah Palin = Sarah Palin; the ALA Woman = Deborah Caldwell-Stone of the American Library Association’s Office for Intellectual Freedom; the President = Barack Hussein Obama

To: Megan Fox

Ms. Fox,

Our [library] received your recent FOIA request related to the crisis workshop held December 17, 2013. I attended this event but have been told not to respond to you so I am doing this [after work] from a new email account. My job would be threatened if it were known I was telling you this so please do not try to ID me.

My notes from the workshop were taken from me [in the past] when a big brouhaha happened about this. Not sure what it was all about but my boss said [he/she] got a call that you were looking for things related to the workshop and depending on FOIA and so my notes from the workshop were taken at that time and I was told not to ask for them back. They are gone now.

I was told recently that you had used FOIA to ask for them again and that you will be told that no notes exist but that is not true. They were taken but they did exist.

What I can remember about the workshop is this. There were five speakers. Two from Orland Park. Two others were women from the ALA and there was a man from the ILA. Not sure on their names. The two Orland employees were one older with brown hair and glasses and one blonde younger woman. Not sure on their names. But the Director was the older woman and I think the younger woman was the Asst. Director. Not sure. The older woman was more measured and careful when she spoke but the younger one got emotional at times.

You and a friend of yours whose name I don't recall were featured as examples of two people from the tea party who are attacking libraries around the country as part of some plot. The ALA woman said that this is like what happened to Acorn but now the tea party is going after libraries. They really seemed to believe this but [where] I was at few people bought into that.

The Director said that you and your friend were paid operatives of the tea party and that you came to Orland Park in October looking for something to invent a complaint about. They said you made up a story and lied about seeing someone doing inappropriate things. Then you started filing FOIA requests about the library after that excuse. Blondie said that you were paid by the tea party to do this.

Then the Director and Blondie went into a big production about what they had been doing to stop you. The Director said that any library encountering the tea party should involve the police because there are good relationships with the police in towns and villages. The Director said that she has a personal friendship with the Orland police chief and that this was "instrumental" in handling you. I remember how she said the word "instrumental" and she said that the police and the village officials were working with the library on preventing you and your friend from getting any traction. The Director also said that the police should scare you away and have you move on with your lives soon. Blondie said that the police are good tools to use against attackers like you because no one wants the police visiting them and the police will side with the library against patrons especially when they are not even from town.

A big deal was made about how you and your friend do not live in Orland and you are outsiders and paid operatives.

Then it got more personal and they showed slides from your website and I guess your friend's website. I remember a picture of a big shark and also a picture of bees. There was a picture of your friend with Sarah Palin and another picture of him with Hillary Clinton shown. And there were pictures of you that looked like they were head shots taken for promotional purposes. The Director and Blondie said that the two of you were setting up a scheme for money and that this was all a stunt to either get attention for you or to write a book.

Blondie said that Orland was focusing only on you and ignoring your friend because he is gay and it gets messy to attack a gay guy. But they have plenty of examples of how to combat a mom who complains. Treat her like Sarah Palin and tell everyone she is dumb and just makes babies was the gist of that. This is when that photo of Sarah Palin and your friend was shown I think. This was a big section of their talk and it went on for a while about how you were painted as a liar and how Blondie looked at everything you said or wrote to find any inconsistencies. The Director said that as soon as an inconsistency was found that the media were alerted to it as proof that you could not be trusted.

Blondie also said it was necessary to say that you did not have children with you in the library because that further made you a liar. She said that since you had no videos or photos of your kids in the library that it was their word against yours and people automatically believe the library over regular people.

The ALA later picked up that thread and said it was a useful tool to use because people just believe what a library says and we need to take advantage of that. Who would believe that the library was doing anything wrong?

The Director and Blondie then talked about how they were documenting everything that you and your friend did and taking it to the police until a charge could be filed at some point. Once you crossed a line they would be able to neutralize you and get an order from a judge keeping you away from the meetings.

The plan was to ignore anything you wrote in social media as much as possible but counter it using the local media which promised they would put forward the library's defense against your claims.

The strategy was to use the police to get you to stop coming to meetings and to make the community members not believe you by making you look like a liar.

[I or someone] asked in the question answer period if what you were saying is true and if there were reports of things happening in the library and the Director said that unfortunately you had gotten ahold of old reports and were lifting them out of context.

The Director said that no more incident reports would be written on matters in the library and that instead communication would be verbal to avoid FOIA.

The ALA picked this up too and advised everyone to stop writing incident reports and to instead do them as voicemail round robins to be deleted every day. This way staff stays informed but there is no paper trail later.

The takeaways and learning experiences from this matter involved how to neutralize attackers like you and your friend and how to make people not believe them and how to use allies in the community such as the police to make people like you go away.

This was not the kind of workshop a lot of us thought we were signing up for and it [was a waste of everyone’s time]. I was upset that I had to listen to all this. Most of it seemed crazy to me because no one would answer the question on whether or not what you had said happened had happened and if the incident reports were true. It was all just a meeting about how to chase you and your friend away.

There was also a big thing where Blondie got upset and had to justify why she decided to go on some radio show. I forget which one but the ALA woman said that you should never go on a live show unless you are well acquainted with the host and know the questions in advance. She said that Blondie made the mistake of allowing the hosts of the show to put words in her mouth and that damaged the library from a PR perspective. Blondie said she would never do a live interview again and would instead stick to putting out the press releases that the ALA would proof for her.

The ALA and ILA said to never send emails but to call on the phone and the Office for Intellectual Freedom would help. They gave us the number and I remember writing it down. I remember writing down the phone numbers for the Director and Blondie too and the number for Bob from the ILA. No one wanted anything in writing just phone calls. Nothing important on voicemail either just say to call back. It was a big deal to keep saying to keep everything verbal and off email and not in writing.

I am trying to think if there is anything else.

You asked about a presentation that was given and we never received a copy of it but the Director and Blondie had pictures of you in a presentation. It had about 30 slides. They had pictures of you from online and pictures of your friend.

Blondie kept pointing out that he is gay and also that he attacks the President and that he also told everyone years ago that Michelle Obama made a "whitey tape". I didn't know what she was talking about but she really seemed to have a personal hatred of your friend because Blondie got most upset when talking about him.

The Director got most upset when talking about you however. She called you "Ms Fox" and never said the name Megan. Blondie said Megan and also said your friend's first name, I remember. But the Director kept saying "Ms, Fox" and her tea party colleague. She said that you live in Mokena and your friend lives in Chicago and you both have no business being in their library.

I also remember that a jab was made at you for being a homeschooler and for being tea party members and that you should not be hanging out all day with a gay guy with your kids anyway.

Why aren't you and him at work? Blondie asked that. Why don't you have jobs? And Blondie made a crack about maybe you should be at home taking care of your kids and not harassing the library.

It was a very strange workshop. No one I know who went had a positive response to it.

Then afterwards it was pretty much forgotten until March when the brouhaha happened and my boss came racing around telling me that I had to get rid of everything from the workshop. That's when my notes were taken.

And now we are back at this again for some reason and I'm being asked if I got rid of all my notes because you are emailing about this again and everyone wants to make sure. My boss said [he/she] got a call about this to make sure. I don't know who the call was from. But I thought you should know because I've never been to a workshop like this where afterwards it was a big thing to collect all the notes and pretend like it never happened.

And I never was at a conference where people talked so personally about patrons like you and your friend. That has never happened before and I thought you should know.

I do not want any trouble so do not try to contact me or find me. This is the only contact I am going to have with you and I hope you understand and it is the only help I can give you.

—

URL of this page: 
safelibraries.blogspot.com/2017/01/brave-librarian-speaks-out.html

On Twitter:
@ALALibrary @HillBuzz @jaslar +Megan Fox +Megan Fox @MeganFoxWriter @OIF

Follow @SafeLibraries

Bittman v Fox: SafeLibraries Dismissed Second Time

Bittman v. Fox United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division May 16, 2016 No. 14 C 08191 Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.  Bridget Bittman, Plaintiff,  v. Megan Fox, et al., Defendants.

ORDER

          For the reasons stated more fully below, Defendant Dan Kleinman's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint against him for lack of personal jurisdiction [103] is granted, and this case is terminated.

STATEMENT

          In this lawsuit, plaintiff Bridget Bittman, a marketing and public relations professional employed by the Orland Park Public Library, alleges that the defendants[1] undertook "efforts to defame, discredit, disparage and damage Ms. Bittman's reputation and thereby cause her to suffer harm." This court previously granted the motion to dismiss of one of the defendants, Dan Kleinman, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Order, ECF No. 89. Bittman thereafter filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). SAC, ECF No. 91. In the SAC Bittman still fails to allege that Kleinman created sufficient case-specific contacts with the state of Illinois to establish a prima facie case that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Kleinman.

Facts

          In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(b)(2), the Court takes as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and resolves any factual disputes in the affidavits in favor of the plaintiff. Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Felland v. Chilon, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(2)).

          The backdrop to this law suit is an ongoing debate between two camps with different views about the materials that should be accessible in public and school libraries. Defendant Kleinman is a vocal critic of open-Internet policies advanced by some libraries and the American Library Association that he believes make sexually inappropriate materials available in libraries; Kleinman authors a blog called SafeLibraries and describes himself as a "'library watchdog' and journalist who has voiced critical opinions about library policies and practices, nationwide, which allow library patrons to access and view pornography on public library computers." According to Bittman, Kleinman is a "close associate" of defendants Fox and Dujan and works in concert with them to promote "safe libraries." Bittman and others in the library community generally defend broader access policies on free speech and anti-censorship grounds. From the information already at issue in this case, which is still in the pleadings stage, the behavior of some of the partisans in both camps bears little resemblance to the sort of substantive and respectful public discourse that should ideally characterize debates about important public policy issues and instead exemplifies the sort of juvenile tactics one would expect to see the antagonists in a schoolyard playground argument employ. This lawsuit arises from such an encounter.

          The SAC maintains the same core allegations against Kleinman as the last complaint. Specifically, Bitman alleges that on July 27, 2014, Kleinman published on his "Safe Libraries" blog a video taken by defendants Fox and Dujan, entitled "Bridget Bittman commits Disorderly Conduct/Breach of Peace on 7/8/14," with this allegedly untruthful title and other allegedly defamatory commentary placed into captions. The video, which is central to the complaint and properly considered on this motion, records an encounter in the parking lot of the Orland Park library between Bittman and Diane Jennings, a trustee of the Orland Park library, on the one hand, and Fox, Dujan, and John Kraft, another "safe libraries" activist, on the other. As seen in the video, after leaving the library, Bittman and Jennings approach Fox, Dujan, and Kraft, who are standing on the sidewalk nearby videotaping them and a brief argument ensues in which the activists refuse to move out of Bittman's path and Jennings launches a number of expletives at Kraft, whose own tone and comments are also uncivil. The activists also claim, in subsequent publications of the video and related commentary, that Bittman and Jennings directed anti-gay slurs at Dujan during the encounter, but at that point the background noise on the recording drowns out the audio and no such comments by Bittman are discernible (at least on the basis of the video available on Kleinman's blog). The entire incident lasted less than 90 seconds and could have been avoided entirely if either side had behaved maturely and gone about their business rather than provoking the opposing group. Instead, several of the antagonists—specifically, Bittman, Fox, and Dujan, engaged in almost three years of litigation before settling their dispute.

          Defendant Kleinman, who is a resident of New Jersey and claims never to have set foot in Illinois, had nothing to do with this encounter. He finds himself embroiled in this lawsuit, however, because he posted the video, and some related commentary, on the "safe libraries" blog he publishes from his home. The SAC alleges that two statements made by Kleinman were defamatory. Kleinman's July 27 blog post, see http://safelibraries.blogspot.com/2014/07/gay-hate-at-your-library.html, is entitled "Gay Hate @ Your Library." In it Kleinman writes that the video shows Bittman "attack[ing] a gay man." The SAC refers to this statement as the "Republication Statement." SAC ¶ 98, ECF No. 91. Bittman further alleges that—at some unspecified time and place—Kleinman has characterized her as a "homophobe," and that on August 21, 2014—again, with no context specified—"defendant Kleinman expressly characterized Ms. Bittman as a 'gay hater'"; she dubs the latter statement "the Gay Hater Statement." Id. ¶¶ 138-139. According to the SAC, "Ms. Bittman is not a 'gay hater' or 'homophobe.'" Id. ¶ 140.

          In addition to reprising these allegations from the First Amended Complaint, the SAC also contains the following new allegations about Kleinman and his contacts with the state of Illinois:

Defendant Kleinman further republished the July 8 Video by providing a link to the July 8 Video in comments he made in response to articles found on the website known as Illinois Leaks: Edgar County Watchdogs ("Edgar County Watchdogs"). Edgar County Watchdogs is a website on which articles appear relating to numerous counties in the State of Illinois. Edgar County Watchdogs posts numerous articles regarding the Defendants' interactions with the Orland Park Public Library. Along with the link to the July 8 Video he posted on the Edgar County Watchdogs website, Defendant Kleinman again falsely stated that Ms. Bittman "attacked a gay man." Defendant Kleinman further republished the July 8 Video by providing a link to the July 8 Video in comments he made to an article [sic] concerning the Orland Park Public Library on the website for the Chicago Tribune. Defendant Kleinman further republished the July 8 Video by providing a link to the July 8 Video in multiple tweets published through the social media platform Twitter using his handle @safelibraries.

SAC ¶¶ 100-106, ECF No. 91.

          As to Kleinman's contacts with Illinois, Bittman now alleges:

Kleinman has availed himself of Illinois laws by filing numerous Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests related to Bittman's position at the Orland Park Public Library, pursuant to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1, et seq. Further, Kleinman directed his conduct toward Ms. Bittman in this jurisdiction by appearing via video-teleconference at Orland Park Public Library Board meetings. Additionally, Kleinman has further availed himself of Illinois laws by filing a complaint with the Illinois Attorney General in relation to Orland Park Public Library meetings and alleged violations of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, 5 ILCS 120/1, et seq. In a further effort to harm Ms. Bittman in this jurisdiction, Kleinman posted comments relating to his wrongful conduct in response to several Chicago Tribune articles about the Orland Park Public Library on the Chicago Tribune website (per example, http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/dailysouthtown/news/ctstaorlandlibrarysettlest032020150319story). In addition, he posted comments to articles found on a website known as Illinois Leaks: Edgar County Watchdogs ("Edgar County Watchdogs") that reports on activities in Cook County and the surrounding Illinois counties (per example, http://edgarcountywatchdogs.com/2014/07/orland-park-library-officials-call-people-fruit-faggotgay/).

SAC ¶¶ 13-16, ECF No. 91.

          The SAC alleges, in relevant part, that Kleinman defamed Bittman and committed the tort of false light invasion of privacy. Counts Five and Six, as they pertain to Kleinman, seek relief for the republication of the July 8 video with the "Republication Statement." Counts Eight and Nine are directed at Kleinman's "Gay Hater Statement." Kleinman again moves to dismiss the Bittman's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

DISCUSSION

          Kleinman argues that Bittman has not cured any of the deficiencies with regard to personal jurisdiction that this Court noted in its prior order. He again contends, as this Court previously concluded, that he is not subject to general personal jurisdiction because he has never been to Illinois, does not own property here, do business here, or otherwise engage in ongoing contact that makes Illinois his "home." Kleinman further argues that he does not have sufficient litigation-related contacts to allow for specific personal jurisdiction. Kleinman operates his blog from his home in New Jersey. He also contends that he has never directed any blog post toward Illinois readers and that he has never directed "any activities, let alone tortious activities" toward Bittman or Illinois.

          A federal court in Illinois may exercise personal jurisdiction over Kleinman if the Illinois long-arm statute would allow it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Illinois' statute contains a catch-all provision that permits personal jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements merge. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209(c).

          Personal jurisdiction may be "general" or "specific." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). General personal jurisdiction exists where the defendant's continuous operations within the forum state are "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318). "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).

          Bittman, again, apparently does not dispute that the courts of Illinois would lack general personal jurisdiction over Kleinman. And given that Kleinman has never been to the state, it is plain that it is not his domicile, and Bittman has not alleged "continuous operations" or contacts that could possibly subject him to general personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Therefore, once again, the question is solely whether the Illinois courts could exercise specific personal jurisdiction against Kleinman with respect to the defamation and false-light claims based on the Republication and Gay-Hater statements.

          Specific personal jurisdiction exists if Bittman's defamation and false-light claims against Kleinman arise out of Kleinman's constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum state. See uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 425; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). "The key question is therefore whether the defendant [has] sufficient 'minimum contacts' with Illinois such that the maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-701 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Specific jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant has purposely directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities. Id. at 702, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).

          As in its previous ruling, this Court finds Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and the Seventh Circuit's Tamburo decision instructive. In Calder, the Supreme Court held that California could exercise personal jurisdiction in a libel action over the author and editor of an article published in the National Inquirer about the actress Shirley Jones, although the defendants were Florida residents, the article was written and edited there, and the tabloid was a Florida corporation. See id. at 785-86. The Supreme Court reasoned:

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California.

Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89. The Court further reasoned that the defendants' "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California" where "they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation." Id. at 789-90.

          In Tamburo, the Seventh Circuit primarily drew upon Calder when charged "to apply long-established rules for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the relatively new setting of torts committed over the Internet." 601 F.3d at 697. There, the owners of websites providing free information about dog breeds were sued for defamation and various business torts after they published critical posts about and encouraged a boycott of the operator of a dog-breeding software company who had used information from those websites. The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by extracting from Calder three "requirements" to show "purposeful direction," namely: "(1) intentional conduct (or 'intentional and allegedly tortious' conduct); (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) with the defendant's knowledge that the effects would be felt—that is, the plaintiff would be injured—in the forum state." Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703. As to the key inquiry—whether website operators had "expressly aimed" their conduct at the state of Illinois, the appellate court answered in the affirmative, reasoning that the individual defendants "published false and defamatory statements" about plaintiff, encouraged a boycott of his business, and published his address urging readers to contact and harass him, all "with the knowledge that Tamburo lived in Illinois and operated his business there." Id. at 706. "Thus, although they acted from points outside the forum state, these defendants specifically aimed their tortious conduct at Tamburo and his business in Illinois with the knowledge that he lived, worked, and would suffer the 'the brunt of the injury' there." Id.

          Since Calder, and even since Tamburo, however, the Supreme Court has further clarified that the situs of the plaintiff's injury is relevant but not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014), emphasized that the relation between the foreign defendant and the forum state "must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself' creates with the forum State. 134 S. Ct. at 1122, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the analysis "looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there." Id. Finally, the Court clearly stated that "the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum"; rather, it "is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State." Id. All of these principles apply with equal force when intentional torts are alleged. Id. at 1123. The Walden Court stated that these principles had driven the result in Calder because in that case, the defendants had developed their story by contacting sources located in California and "wrote an article for publication in California," where they knew that their tabloid had its largest circulation (of more than 600,000 copies) and would be most likely to damage Jones's reputation there. Id. at 1124. The reputational injury incurred as a result of the article being read by hundreds of thousands of readers in California "connected the defendants' conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there." Id. By contrast, the Court concluded, personal jurisdiction was lacking in Walden because the location of the plaintiff's injury was not a sufficient contact with the forum state of Nevada. Id. at 1125. There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant police officer's intentionally tortious conduct in Georgia—wrongfully seizing and retaining the plaintiffs' cash and submitting a false probable cause affidavit in support of a forfeiture action—was not sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in Nevada, even if the defendant acted with the knowledge that his conduct would injure the plaintiffs in Nevada.

          Building on Walden, the Seventh Circuit held in Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2014), that the district court erred in concluding that personal jurisdiction could be exercised in a trademark case over a defendant maker of projectile irritants that allegedly misled consumers into believing it was the only maker of PepperBall products. The Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Real Action, in Indiana, despite the following contacts: "Real Action fulfilled several orders of the allegedly infringing projectiles for purchasers in Indiana; second, it knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that the misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana; third, it sent at least two misleading email blasts to a list that included Indiana residents; fourth, it had an interactive website available to residents of Indiana; and finally, it put customers on its email list when they made a purchase, thereby giving the company some economic advantage." Id at 801. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff has no evidence of any actual sales by Real Action in Indiana, and that, in any event, de minimis sales would not support personal jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury in Indiana, its home state, was not relevant to whether the defendant itself had created contacts with the forum state. Id. at 802. Finally, the defendant's online activities—"the sending of two allegedly misleading emails to a list of subscribers that included Indiana residents and the maintenance of an interactive website"—did not show that the defendant "targeted Indiana somehow." Id. at 803-803.

          Previously, this Court held that Bittman's allegations were insufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific personal jurisdiction because, in summary, the fact that Kleinman republished and commented upon a video concerning an Illinois resident employed by an Illinois library on a subject-specific "watchdog" website that is accessible by anyone, anywhere, did not constitute conduct "expressly aimed at" the State of Illinois. In particular, this Court noted that operating even an "interactive" website "should not open a defendant up to personal jurisdiction in every spot on the planet where that interactive website is accessible." Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, 751 F.3d at 803. This Court further noted that Bittman had not plausibly alleged any concerted activity between Kleinman and defendants (and Illinois residents) Fox or Dujan, such as having contacted them as "sources" for his blog post rather than republishing their publicly available content wholesale. Nor had Bittman plausibly alleged that Kleinman had reason to believe that his blog post would be read widely (or even at all) in Illinois; there are no allegations that the blog has an Illinois readership, let alone a significant one, in marked contrast to Calder. In short, Bittman had not shown any connection between Kleinman's allegedly defamatory conduct and the State of Illinois except for her own presence (and therefore her injury) there.

          Kleinman now argues that the SAC suffers from all the same defects and that the additional allegations do not strengthen the case for specific personal jurisdiction, and this Court agrees that many of the new allegations are irrelevant to specific personal jurisdiction in this case. For example, Bittman now argues: "Kleinman availed himself of Illinois laws by filing numerous state FOIA requests related to Ms. Bittman's position at the OPPL; arranging to appear and appearing via video teleconference at OPPL meetings that occurred in Orland Park, Illinois; and, filing a complaint with the Illinois Attorney General in relation to OPPL meetings and alleged violations of the Illinois Open Meetings Act." Mem. 5-6, ECF No. 117 (emphasis in original). This is activity that provides some connection between Kleinman and the state, but it bears at best a remote and tangential relationship with the defamation and false-light claims Bittman has asserted. Those claims plainly do not "arise out" of any of this conduct, and therefore, it does not support her case for specific personal jurisdiction over Kleinman with respect to the content of the July 8 video, the Republication Statement, or the Gay Hater Statement. See Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 801 (to establish specific personal jurisdiction, it is the defendant's "suit-related" conduct that must create the substantial connection with the forum state).

          Yet some of Bittman's new allegations are relevant to her argument for personal jurisdiction. Specifically, Bittman now alleges that Kleinman not only published the July 8 video on his own blog, but that he republished it in other online outlets that have more direct connections to Illinois than does Kleinman's own blog. He "provid[ed] a link to the July 8 Video in comments he made in response to articles found on" the Edgar County Watchdogs website, "on which articles appear relating to numerous counties in the State of Illinois." In those comments, he again "stated that Ms. Bittman 'attacked a gay man.'" Bittman further alleges that Kleinman "provid[ed] a link to the July 8 Video in comments he made to an article concerning the Orland Park Public Library on the website for the Chicago Tribune."

          Kleinman contends that his comments on Illinois-based websites are of no import because "Plaintiff does not allege in her latest Complaint that Kleinman directed these comments to Illinois readers, or had any reason to believe that any statements made in the comment section of either website would be read widely here, or would reach a significant Illinois readership." Reply 8, ECF No. 119. He continues: "It is highly unlikely that any such statements—which were not in an article themselves, but rather buried in the comments below an article—would circulate widely. Additionally, though these websites are read by people in Illinois, they are also publicly available and accessible by anyone, anywhere (to a blogger in New Jersey, for example)." Id.

          Kleinman's argument is not entirely persuasive. Bittman is entitled to reasonable inferences in her favor. According to the SAC, Kleinman "republished" the same allegedly defamatory July 8 video on both the Chicago Tribune and Edgar County Watchdogs websites. Although these websites may be accessible worldwide, it is reasonable to infer that their readership includes significant numbers of Illinois residents because they cover state and local news.

          Even so, simply adding the allegations that Kleinman "republished" the July 8 video in the comments sections of two websites with (this court will assume) substantial Illinois readerships is not sufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction over her claims. First, although the point is even more pertinent to the merits of Bittman's claims, a reference to a hyperlink is not likely to constitute "publication" for purposes of Illinois defamation law.[2] As this Court previously has noted: "[a] hyperlink . . . does not duplicate the content of a prior publication; rather, it identifies the location of an existing publication and, if selected, instructs a search engine to retrieve that publication." Doctor's Data, Inc. v. Barrett, ---F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 10 C 03795, 2016 WL 1086510, at *33 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2016). For this reason, several courts have concluded that displaying a hyperlink is not the same as restating the alleging defamatory material. See id. (collecting cases). For purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, Bittman's claims must arise directly from Kleinman's Illinois-based activities, but she can have no claim against him that arises from the simple posting of a hyperlink, which is not "publication" of material. Indeed, she does not appear to have broadened her defamation and false-light claims to include this alleged activity; she continues to focus only on the Republication Statement and the Gay-Hater statement.

          Second, the interactive nature of online communication—which by its nature can be pursued from almost any location at any time—diminishes the jurisdictional import of those communications. See Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 803. Particularly with respect to a publication like the Tribune website, with a substantial national readership, posting a comment to an online article seems several steps removed from deliberating targeting tortious communications toward an audience in a particular state. Cf. NTE LLC v. Kenny Constr. Co., No. 14 C 9558, 2015 WL 6407532, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015) ("[Visiting a website] is unlike other examples of minimum contacts because the act of visiting a website that is not situated in a specific geographical location does not purposefully avail the user of the protection and benefit of the server state's laws."); Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc., No. 15 C 7681, 2016 WL 245910, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016) (use of interactive software by millions of Illini insufficient to provide specific personal jurisdiction over Facebook).In the posts that Bittman identifies, moreover, Kleinman was responding to content posted by others, rather than reaching into the state to disseminate defamatory material.

          Finally, Bittman's vague and cursory descriptions of Kleinman's conduct also diminish the jurisdictional import of her new allegations; Bittman simply does not give sufficient detail about what Kleinman said, or where, or when, to assess the degree to which the alleged comments are suit-related or reflect efforts to injure Bittman in Illinois. The hyperlinks included in ¶ 16 of the SAC shed no further light, as they do not support Bittman's allegations. The one purporting to link to a Chicago Tribune article is defective. The link to the "Edgar County Watchdogs" website brings a post to which the commenter "safelibraries" posted a hyperlink to Kleinman's original July 27, 2014, blog post with no further statements. This has no relevance to Bittman's claims about the "gay hater statement" (Counts 8 and 9) and only a remote connection to the Republication Statement that is the subject of Counts 5 and 6. That connection is no stronger than the one in Advanced Tactical where directing emails to a list that included Indiana residents was deemed not to be behavior that "targeted" Indiana residents. 751 F.3d at 803-803. Indeed, Bittman does not allege that Kleinman's hyperlink directed any traffic to the Republication Statement; she instead complains that he made "comments" that are not further identified or explained in any way, see SAC ¶ 16, and that he linked to the July 8 video, see SAC ¶ 100. If sending emails directly to residents of the forum state does not equate to "deliberate actions by the defendant to target or direct [himself] toward the forum state," Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 803, then it is difficult to conclude that the posting of undescribed comments in response to two online articles could do so.

          Despite this Court's express suggestion that she do so if possible, Bittman has not alleged that Kleinman reached into Illinois to find sources in Illinois for his allegedly defamatory blog posts, nor has she provided any detail about how Kleinman allegedly worked "in concert with" Dujan or Fox with respect to his allegedly defamatory actions. See Order 7, ECF No. 89. Nor has Bittman added any detail regarding when, where, and to whom Kleinman allegedly made the "Gay Hater" and "homophobe" comments, even though this Court pointed out that confusing deficiency in the First Amended Complaint, See Order 2 n.2, ECF No. 89. It is only the posting of the unspecified "comments" and hyperlinks to the July 8 video that add anything to Bittman's original jurisdictional allegations against Kleinman. (As already noted, Kleinman's FOIA requests or complaints about the library board's closed meetings have nothing to do with Bittman's defamation claims.) Moreover, Bittman has not even mentioned, let alone attempted to distinguish, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Advanced Tactical, despite this Court's reliance on that case in dismissing the complaint against Kleinman the first time.

          Therefore, Bittman has not made a prima facie case that her defamation and false-light claims against Kleinman arise from conduct that he purposefully directed at the State of Illinois. Unlike the publisher in Calder, Kleinman had no reason to believe that his blog had a substantial Illinois readership that would lead to reputational harm to Bittman in her home state. (Indeed, Bittman still has not alleged that SafeLibraries has any Illinois readership.[3]) From the links provided in Bittman's SAC, it appears that Kleinman's target audience is an echo chamber of fellow critics of the American Library Association's open-Internet policies, not any particular regional constituency. Absent some plausible allegation that Kleinman, like the Enquirer in Calder, purposefully created and exploited his own contacts with the state in order to injure Bittman here, Bittman fails to sufficiently allege suit-related conduct by Kleinman that connects her claims to the forum state; her own forum-state injuries are not enough to provide that connection.

          Because there has been no prima facie showing that Kleinman expressly directed any tortious conduct at the State of Illinois, rather than at an Internet audience of fellow activists, this Court further concludes that it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kleinman. "[T[he weaker the defendant's contacts with the forum state are, the less likely it is that exercising jurisdiction over that defendant is appropriate." Illinois v. Hemi Grp. LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2010). Indeed, where minimum contacts are lacking, "we need not go further in the personal-jurisdiction analysis." N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2014). In any event, although there is some efficiency interest in permitting Bittman to proceed against all the defendants in one lawsuit, and the State of Illinois has an interest in providing a forum in which its residents may obtain relief, Kleinman is an outlier among the Illinois-based defendants. The burden of compelling him to defend a lawsuit from across the country outweighs the other interests, given the tenuous connection between Kleinman's allegedly tortious conduct and the forum state.

***

          Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted based on a lack of personal jurisdiction over Kleinman, and Kleinman's other arguments for dismissal need not be considered. Bittman will be given no further leave to re-plead against Kleinman. She made poor use of her last opportunity to supply crucial details about litigation-specific contacts between Kleinman and Illinois and brought almost nothing new to bear in her second brief on personal jurisdiction, instead largely copying her original arguments. However, this dismissal is without prejudice to Bittman bringing her claims in a court that may properly assert jurisdiction over Kleinman.

          __________________________
          [1] All individual defendants other than Mr. Kleinman have now been dismissed.

          [2] A claim of defamation under Illinois law requires pleading that "the defendants made a false statement concerning [the plaintiff], that there was an unprivileged publication to a third party with fault by the defendant, which caused damage to the plaintiff." Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 124 Ill. 2d 483, 490, 530 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1988).

          [3] Bittman does assert: "Upon information and belief, a significant number of the Plaintiff's colleagues, peers and supervisors have become aware of and read the False and Defamatory Statements. Patrons of the Orland Park Public Library have become aware of and read the False and Defamatory Statements." SAC ¶¶ 147-148, ECF No. 91. However, "False and Defamatory Statements" in the context of the SAC refers to many statements that are not attributable to Kleinman, see id. ¶ 141, and Bittman nowhere alleges that anyone in Illinois read the Republication Statement or the Gay Hater statement on Kleinman's blog or that the blog has an Illinois readership. Moreover, the issue as to personal jurisdiction over Kleinman is not that some Illini have read the "False and Defamatory Statements"; that is simply another way of saying that Illinois is the locus of the plaintiff's injuries. But it is Kleinman's contacts with the state, not Bittman's, that determine whether the court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over him.


                                                                                       _________/s/_________
Date: May 16, 2016                                                       John J. Tharp, Jr.
                                                                                       United States District Judge

Case: 1:14-cv-08191 Document #: 127 Filed: 05/16/16 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:1328

—

See also, for the prior dismissal and list of prior history:

• "Bittman v Fox: SafeLibraries Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction," by Dan Kleinman, SafeLibraries, 31 March 2016.
• "Orland Park Library's Bridget Bittman Defeated Again — Judge Dismisses SLAPP Lawsuit," by John Kraft, Illinois Leaks, Edgar County Watchdogs, 16 May 2016.

I waited over a month to publish this to allow any possibility of appeal to expire.  Expect to hear more as I have successfully stood up for the First Amendment rights of reporters and for the free speech rights of government whistleblowers.  Can you imagine being sued as a reporter for filing Freedom of Information Act requests?  Wow.

I especially love that my reporting on someone calling out the homophobic activities of people has not been suppressed or censored and that I withstood tremendous pressure to self-censor.  Love wins, not censorship!  When I get a chance, I'll officially thank Lambda Legal for helping me find the excellent attorney who successfully defended my rights, an attorney I highly recommend.

People who display homophobic activities should not be able to sue people like me into silence.  That said, the suit did not include the person who published the information to which I merely linked, so there is very strong evidence that censorship was the goal of this suit, not defending against "defamation."  I'll publish more on this eventually as ALA trained librarians to file false defamation suits just to tie up the time and money (up to $500K they trained) of child porn whistleblowers.

Note that my previous publication of the judicial decision of my first dismissal resulted in an immediate demand that I delete the publication.  Censors watch SafeLibraries and jump immediately to demand I remove content.  Consider subscribing to SafeLibraries to see what the censors don't want people to know.

For a full and complete description of this lawsuit and of the person who sued me, buy:

• "Shut Up! The Bizarre War that One Public Library Waged Against the First Amendment," by Megan Fox and Kevin DuJan, Amazon (2016).

Hooray for the First Amendment and press freedom!

URL of this page: safelibraries.blogspot.com/2016/06/bittman-v-fox-dismissed-again.html

On Twitter: @ECWDogs @HillBuzz @MeganFoxWriter @OrlandPkLibrary @StoryTimeDigita

Follow @SafeLibraries

Bittman v Fox: SafeLibraries Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Bittman v. Fox United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division September 23, 2015 No. 14 C 08191  Bridget Bittman, Plaintiff,  v. Megan Fox, et al., Defendants.

ORDER

For the reasons stated more fully below, Defendant Dan Kleinman's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [39] is granted without prejudice. The plaintiff's amended complaint, if any, is to be filed within 21 days of this order.


STATEMENT

In the Amended Complaint, plaintiff Bridget Bittman, a marketing and public relations professional employed by the Orland Park Public Library, alleges that the defendants undertook "efforts to defame, discredit, disparage and damage Ms. Bittman's reputation and thereby cause her to suffer harm." Am. Compl., Dkt. # 34 ¶ 16. One of the defendants, Dan Kleinman, moves for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a plausible claim of defamation or false light against him. Because the Amended Complaint fails to allege adequately that Kleinman himself created any contacts with the state of Illinois other than the fact that his website may be accessed by Illinois residents, Bittman fails to establish a prima facie case that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Kleinman. Lacking personal jurisdiction over Kleinman, the Court cannot otherwise address the sufficiency of the claims against him.


Facts

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(b)(2), the Court takes as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and resolves any factual disputes in the affidavits in favor of the plaintiff. Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6)); Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(2)). The following facts are, therefore, accepted as true.

According to the complaint, the defendants do not live in Orland Park but are "community activists who oppose unfiltered access to the Internet at public libraries." Am. Compl., Dkt. # 34 ¶¶ 24-25. In the Fall of 2013, Bittman publicly responded to complaints from defendants (and Illinois residents) Megan Fox and Kevin Dujan about the Orland Park Public Library providing unfiltered access to the Internet. After that, Bittman says, they began to personally attack, harass, and threaten her. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 31. As relevant here, on July 8, 2014, Fox posted on YouTube video footage of Bittman during a confrontation with Dujan and another activist; the video was marked with a description and captions that Bittman says are untrue and defamatory. The video depicts Bittman exiting the Orland Park Civic Center and briskly walking directly toward the two individuals who were filming from some distance away, asking "Can I help you?" As she walks toward the individuals, the video's caption reads: "Bittman makes a beeline for us clenching something . . . mace? Pepper spray? Stink bomb?" Another caption appears while Bittman is talking; it reads "'Look at him, this fruit is blocking me.'" The video was posted with a description including the phrase "Video of Bridget Bittman committing Disorderly Conduct/Breach of Peace on 7/8/14." According to Bittman, she did not have any weapon in her hand and did not call anyone a "fruit" during the encounter, nor did she commit disorderly conduct or breach of peace.

On July 27, 2014, this video (the "July 8 video"), with the allegedly defamatory title and captions, was republished by Defendant Kleinman on his blog entitled "Safe Libraries," along with Kleinman's commentary. Am. Compl., Dkt. # 34 ¶¶ 93-96. Kleinman describes himself as "'library watchdog and journalist' who has criticized policies that allow library patrons "to access and view pornography." Mem., Dkt. # 40 at 1. According to the Amended Complaint, Kleinman is a "close associate" of Fox and Dujan and worked in concert with them. [FN1] Kleinman's July 27 post, see http://safelibraries.blogspot.com/2014/07/gay-hate-at-your-library.html , is entitled "Gay Hate @ Your Library." In it Kleinman writes that the video shows Bittman "attack[ing] a gay man." The Amended Complaint refers to this statement as the "Republication Statement." The complaint further alleges that on August 21, 2014, [FN2] Kleinman characterized Bittman as a "gay hater," and that he has also characterized her as a "homophobe." Am. Compl., Dkt. # 34 ¶¶ 127-130. Bittman says she is not homophobic and does not hate gay people.

Kleinman resides in the State of New Jersey and operates the Safe Libraries blog from his home. According to Kleinman, on the blog he publishes "articles of public interest about libraries located all over the country." He has never been to Illinois, nor does he own any property in the state or do business there.


Discussion

The Amended Complaint alleges, in relevant part, that Kleinman defamed Bittman and committed the tort of false light invasion of privacy. In Counts Five and Six, Bittman alleges that Kleinman committed defamation per se and placed her in a false light because the Republication Statement falsely imputes that she attacked a gay man and engaged in criminal activity. Counts Eight and Nine assert claims of defamation per se and false light, respectively, based upon Kleinman's "gay hater" and "homophobe" statements. Kleinman moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

Kleinman argues that he is not subject to general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois because he has no contact with the state. His supporting affidavit sets forth the facts—uncontested by the plaintiff—that he resides in New Jersey and has never visited, lived in, or worked in Illinois. Nor has Kleinman ever entered into a contract, owned property or done business in Illinois. Kleinman operates his blog from his home in New Jersey. He also contends that he has never directed any blog post toward Illinois readers and that he has never directed "any activities, let alone tortious activities" toward Bittman or Illinois. Bittman disputes these contentions but does not further augment the factual allegations of her complaint or supply any affidavit.

A federal court in Illinois may exercise personal jurisdiction over Kleinman if the Illinois long-arm statute would allow it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Illinois' statute contains a catch-all provision that permits personal jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements merge. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209(c).

Personal jurisdiction may be "general" or "specific." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014); Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). General personal jurisdiction exists where the defendant's continuous operations within the forum [7]  state are "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318). "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011). Bittman does not dispute that the courts of Illinois would lack general personal jurisdiction over Kleinman, so the Court may set aside Kleinman's arguments on that point.

Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claims against the defendant arise out of the defendant's constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum state. uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 425; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). "The key question is therefore whether the defendant [has] sufficient 'minimum contacts' with Illinois such that the maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-701 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Specific jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant has purposely directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities. Id. at 702, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).

In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984), the Supreme Court held that California could exercise personal jurisdiction in a libel action over the author and editor of an article published in the National Inquirer about the actress Shirley Jones, although the defendants were Florida residents, the article was written and edited there, and the tabloid was a Florida corporation. See id. at 785-86. The Supreme Court reasoned:

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California.

Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89. The Court further reasoned that the defendants' "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California" where "they they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation." Id. at 789-90.

In Tamburo, the Seventh Circuit primarily drew upon Calder when charged "to apply long-established rules for asserting personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the relatively new setting of torts committed over the Internet." 601 F.3d at 697. There, the owners of websites providing free information about dog breeds were sued for defamation and various business torts after they published critical posts about and encouraged a boycott of the operator of a dog-breeding software company who had used information from those websites. The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by extracting from Calder three "requirements" to show "purposeful direction," namely: "(1) intentional conduct (or 'intentional and allegedly tortious' conduct); (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) with the defendant's knowledge that the effects would be felt—that is, the plaintiff would be injured—in the forum state." Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703. As to the key inquiry—whether website operators had "expressly aimed" their conduct at the state of Illinois, the appellate court answered in the affirmative, reasoning that the individual defendants "published false and defamatory statements" about plaintiff, encouraged a boycott of his business, and published his address urging readers to contact and harass him, all "with the knowledge that Tamburo lived in Illinois and operated his business there." Id. at 706. "Thus, although they acted from points outside the forum state, these defendants specifically aimed their tortious conduct at Tamburo and his business in Illinois with the knowledge that he lived, worked, and would suffer the 'the brunt of the injury' there." Id.

Since Calder, and even since Tamburo, however, the Supreme Court has further clarified that the situs of the injury is relevant but not sufficient to establish minimum contacts. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2014), emphasized that the relation between the foreign defendant and the forum state "must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself' creates with the forum State. 134 S. Ct. at 1122, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the analysis "looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there." Id. Finally, the Court clearly stated that "the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum"; rather, it "is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State." Id. All of these principles apply with equal force when intentional torts are alleged. Id. at 1123. The Walden Court stated that these principles had driven the result in Calder because in that case, the defendants had developed their story by contacting sources located in California and "wrote an article for publication in California," where they knew that their tabloid had its largest circulation (of more than 600,000 copies) and would be most likely to damage Jones's reputation there. Id. at 1124. The reputational injury incurred as a result of the article being read by hundreds of thousands of readers in California "connected the defendants' conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who lived there." Id. By contrast, the Court concluded, personal jurisdiction was lacking in Walden because the location of the plaintiff's injury was not a sufficient contact with the forum state of Nevada. Id. at 1125. There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant police officer's intentionally tortious conduct in Georgia—wrongfully seizing and retaining the plaintiffs' cash and submitting a false probable cause affidavit in support of a forfeiture action—was not sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in Nevada, even if the defendant acted with the knowledge that his conduct would injure the plaintiffs in Nevada.

Building on Walden, the Seventh Circuit held in Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2014), that the district court erred in concluding that personal jurisdiction could be exercised in a trademark case over a defendant maker of projectile irritants that allegedly misled consumers into believing it was the only maker of PepperBall products. The Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Real Action, in Indiana, despite the following contacts: "Real Action fulfilled several orders of the allegedly infringing projectiles for purchasers in Indiana; second, it knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that the misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana; third, it sent at least two misleading email blasts to a list that included Indiana residents; fourth, it had an interactive website available to residents of Indiana; and finally, it put customers on its email list when they made a purchase, thereby giving the company some economic advantage." Id at 801. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff has no evidence of any actual sales by Real Action in Indiana, and that, in any event, de minimis sales would not support personal jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury in Indiana, its home state, was not relevant to whether the defendant itself had created contacts with the forum state. Id. at 802. Finally, the defendant's online activities—"the sending of two allegedly misleading emails to a list of subscribers that included Indiana residents and the maintenance of an interactive website"—did not show that the defendant "targeted Indiana somehow." Id. at 803-803.

Here, Kleinman contends that he did not expressly aim any conduct at the State of Illinois because his blog is for a national readership and the post addressed a topic of interest involving "American libraries in general." Reply, Dkt. # 66 at 6. His statements about Bittman and the July 8 video, he argues, were not purposefully directed at Illinois readers because the mere availability of his post to Illinois readers does not mean it was addressed to them in particular. He further argues that the video's depiction of Illinois residents does not mean that the accompanying editorial content was directed to an Illinois readership.

In response, Bittman argues that that Kleinman was collaborating with Fox and Dujan, two "close associates" in Illinois, in publicizing their video and seeking to humiliate and defame her. See Mem., Dkt. # 61 at 3; see also Am. Compl., Dkt. # 34 ¶ 33 (defendants have engaged in "a concerted campaign"); ¶ 132 (defendants "collaborated and worked in concert"). She further argues that under Calder and Tamburo, she has sufficiently alleged that Kleinman purposefully directed the defamatory statements at Illinois because he was "fully aware that [Bittman] resides in Illinois and would feel injury in her personal and professional life in Illinois" and "with a complete understanding that [the video and statements] concerned an Illinois public library and an Illinois citizen." Mem., Dkt. # 61 at 5, 6.

It is Bittman's burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, see N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014), and the Court concludes that she has not met that burden. Calder is the most factually similar of the relevant authorities, but even the relatively attenuated connections between the individual defendants in that case and the State of California were more substantial than what Bittman alleges here. In Calder, the defendants had engaged in conduct in the forum state by contacting sources in California for their allegedly defamatory article, thus purposefully connecting themselves to the state in which the plaintiff's harm was suffered. The defendants also knew that the article would circulate widely—to hundreds of thousands of readers—in California, where the Enquirer was most heavily subscribed. In Calder there was, in short, a basis to conclude that the defendants had "expressly aimed" their alleged libel at the state of California.

Here, by contrast, Bittman does not allege any facts supporting an inference that Kleinman's activities were specifically aimed at Illinois or that he inserted himself into Illinois in any way in order to develop his post, which appears (so far as the present record reflects) to be based upon published reports and not original reporting. Nor does she allege facts to suggest that Bittman had any reason to believe that his blog post would be read widely (or even at all) in Illinois; there are no allegations that the blog has an Illinois readership, in marked contrast to Calder. The injury in a defamation and false-light case is complete only upon publication of the allegedly defamatory material. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124 ("However scandalous a newspaper article might be, it can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to (read and understood by) third persons.").Thus, although Kleinman could certainly anticipate that Bittman would be distressed by his statements, were she ever to read them, absent some allegations of a significant Illinois readership, Bittman supplies no reason to believe that Kleinman knew that Bittman would suffer reputational harm as a result of his post. In a defamation case, to say that the plaintiff "felt the effects" of the tort in the forum state is merely to say that she lives there. And as the Seventh Circuit emphasized in Advanced Tactical, the plaintiff's connection to the forum state cannot be the hook providing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See 751 F.3d at 801. Rather, the defendant's suit-related conduct must supply the connection. Id. Here, Bittman focuses on her own connections to Illinois rather than Kleinman's.

Bittman's reliance on Tamburo is also inapt. In that case, the defendants' activities included encouraging a boycott of the plaintiff's business that they knew to be in Illinois; the allegedly tortious activity, therefore was intended to and would foreseeably bring about an injury in the forum state. See 601 F.3d at 706 ("[T]he individual defendants' use of their public websites to defame an Illinois-based businessman and exhort readers to boycott his products can likewise be conceptualized as an electronic 'entry' into Illinois for jurisdictional purposes."). The defendants also sent emails encouraging a boycott of the plaintiff's products and supplying his address while encouraging readers to harass him. Id. These acts were the "something more" than a forum-state injury that is needed to establish the defendant's "expressly aimed" conduct; the defendants were expressly attempting to incite action by residents of the forum state, against the plaintiff in the forum state. Here, in attempting to establish that Kleinman purposely directed conduct at Illinois, all she can point to is that she, the subject of part of the post, is an Illinois resident working at an Illinois library. In short, the plaintiff is the defendant's only connection to the forum state. Nothing in Tamburo suggests that this could be a sufficient contact to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.

Bittman's allegations of concerted activity between Kleinman in New Jersey and Fox and Dujan in Illinois do not suffice to connect Kleinman to Illinois. First, she does not supply a single factual allegation of any contact or communications between Kleinman and those defendants such that the alleged collaboration or concerted activity appears plausible. Her allegations of concerted action are wholly conclusory and therefore not entitled to any presumption of truth. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (requiring the plaintiff to allege "plausible grounds to infer an agreement"); Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus there is no basis to say here, in contrast to Calder, that Kleinman reached into the state to obtain information for his post, or that he otherwise participated in activity directed at Illinois. Whatever the connection between Kleinman and the Illinois defendants, the complaint leaves it a mystery.

Moreover, to the extent Bittman is attempting to base personal jurisdiction on a theory of joint activity, she wholly fails to address the question whether Illinois endorses the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "the theory may not be valid in Illinois." Smith v. Jefferson Cnty Bd. of Educ., 378 F. App'x 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2010). Recent decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court certainly suggest as much, see Knaus v. Guidry, 389 Ill. App. 3d 804, 825, 906 N.E.2d 644, 661, 329 Ill. Dec. 446 (2009); Ploense v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1107, 882 N.E.2d 653, 667, 317 Ill. Dec. 773 (2007); see also Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill. 2d 431, 440-41, 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1208, 56 Ill. Dec. 657 (1981). Some dispute remains, however. See Cleary v. Philip Morris, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 406, 410, 726 N.E.2d 770, 774, 244 Ill. Dec. 795 (2000) ("We therefore hold that in circumstance where the defendant has actively supported a conspiracy where one of its members operated in Illinois, there may exist the 'minimum contacts' necessary to fairly assert jurisdiction."). This Court need not sort out an answer, as Bittman has failed even to invoke the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction in her arguments although it is her burden to establish personal jurisdiction. Furthermore, as noted, Bittman has not supplied a single detail of the alleged "concerted activity," let alone alleged an actual conspiracy, with any particularity. Therefore, even if the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction were valid, it would not apply here because the "conspiracy" is only hinted at.

In the end, Bittman's case for personal jurisdiction over Kleinman boils down to the undisputed allegations that he republished and commented upon information concerning an Illinois resident employed by an Illinois library on a subject-specific "watchdog" website that is accessible by anyone, anywhere. On these facts, it would indeed offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to hale into an Illinois court an online journalist who has no connection to the state merely because the subject of his article resides there. The writing and posting of the accompanying article, without more, do not suggest that Kleinman was purposefully directing or expressly aiming any conduct at Illinois; operating even an "interactive" website "should not open a defendant up to personal jurisdiction in every spot on the planet where that interactive website is accessible." Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, 751 F.3d at 803. There is simply no reason to believe that Illinois residents were Kleinman's targeted, or even expected, audience, and therefore he cannot be said to have directed his allegedly tortious conduct to the state merely because his subjects were based in Illinois.

For these reasons, the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. Because the Court has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over Kleinman, there is no basis to consider his challenges to the sufficiency of the allegations against him to state a claim. The Court grants the plaintiff leave to file a further amended complaint, within 21 days of the entry of this Order, if she believes in good faith that she can cure the deficiencies in her jurisdictional allegations as to Kleinman.

Date: September 23, 2015

/s/ John J. Tharp, Jr.

John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge


Footnotes

[FN 1]  The Amended Complaint details much more allegedly harassing or defamatory conduct by Fox and Dujan alone, but those facts are not relevant to Kleinman's pending motion.

[FN 2]  Bittman does not identify the context of any August 21 statement. The Court notes, however, the same July 27 blog post incorporated into the Amended Complaint makes reference to Bittman's purported "gay hate" and "homophobic remarks."



### 30 ### 30 ###

Bittman: "Look at him, this fruit is blocking me"

Relevant timeline, listed earliest to latest:

Factual background:

• "URGENT -­ Must Delete All Documents Related to 17 Dec Crisis Communications Workshop," by Deborah-Caldwell Stone, Deputy Director of Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Library Association, 4 April 2014.  This is where ALA orders public librarians to destroy evidence.
• "2014-07-08 = OPPL Spokesperson Commits Disorderly Conduct/Breach of Peace According to Ofc. Schmidt," by Megan Fox, YouTube, 8 July 2014.
• "Orland Park Library Officials Call People 'Fruit', 'Faggot' & 'Gay,'" by John Kraft, Illinois Leaks (Edgar County Watchdogs), 26 July 2014.
• "Gay Hate @ Your Library," by Dan Kleinman, SafeLibraries, 27 July 2014.

Legal action:

• Plaintiff's Complaint; Document 1; 20 October 2014.
• Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; Document 34; 21 January 2015.
• Defendant Dan Kleinman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6); Document 39; 19 February 2015.
• Defendant Dan Kleinman's Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint; Document 40; 19 February 2015.
• Exhibit 1; Declaration of Dan Kleinman; Document 40-1; 19 February 2015.
• ORDER Dismissing Dan Kleinman for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction; Document 89; 23 September 2015.
• Second Amended Complaint; Document 91; 14 October 2015.  
• The above document continues to maintain me as a Defendant, only this time basing jurisdiction on my having filed Freedom of Information Act requests in Illinois.  Recall Judge Tharp said, "The Court grants the plaintiff leave to file a further amended complaint, within 21 days of the entry of this Order, if she believes in good faith that she can cure the deficiencies in her jurisdictional allegations as to Kleinman."  Is my filing FOIA requests a "good faith" basis for bringing suit?  We'll see.  As of 31 March 2016, I remain a Defendant.  Indeed, I'm the sole remaining Defendant.  See: "Orland Park Public Library: Bridget Bittman's SLAPP Lawsuit a Complete and Utter Failure," by John Kraft, Illinois Leaks (Edgar County Watchdogs), 25 March 2016.  

More:

• More articles on this lawsuit.

NOTE ADDED 5 APRIL 2016:

I have added the designation "Document 89" above and have found it discussed here:

• "Bridget Bittman Handed Another Defeat in SLAPP Lawsuit,'" by John Kraft, Illinois Leaks (Edgar County Watchdogs), 23 September 2015.

NOTE ADDED 17 MAY 2016:

Yesterday I was dismissed from the case a second time, this time with prejudice, and I was the sole remaining defendant.  "Document 127" and "Document 128" are here as well:

• "Orland Park Library's Bridget Bittman Defeated Again — Judge Dismisses SLAPP Lawsuit," by John Kraft, Illinois Leaks, Edgar County Watchdogs, 16 May 2016.

URL of this page: safelibraries.blogspot.com/2016/03/bittman-v-fox-safelibraries-dismissed.html

On Twitter:  @ECWDogs  +Megan Fox @MeganFoxWriter @SafeLibraries @StoryTimeDigita

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